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Abstract
This article studies the impact of longevity and taxation on life-cycle decisions and
long-run income. Individuals allocate optimally their total lifetime between education,
working and retirement. They also decide at each moment how much to save or con-
sume out of their income, and after entering the labor market how to divide their time
between labor and leisure. The model incorporates experience-earnings proﬁles and
the return-to-education function that follows evidence from the labor literature. In
this setup, increases in longevity raises the investment in education - time in school -
and retirement. The model is calibrated to the U.S. and is able to reproduce observed
schooling levels and the increase in retirement, as the evidence shows. Simulations
show that a country equal to the U.S. but with 20% smaller longevity will be 25%
poorer. In this economy, labor taxes have a strong impact on the per capita income, as
it decreases labor eﬀort, time at school and retirement age, in addition to the general
equilibrium impact on physical capital. We conclude that life-cycle eﬀects are relevant
in analyzing the aggregate outcome of taxation.
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11 Introduction
One of the most impressive facts of the twentieth century is the large increase of educational
attainment of the adult population. In 1990, the median schooling of a male aged 25 years
in the U.S., according to estimations in Gustavus and Nam (1964) based on Census Data,
was 6.8 years. By 2000 it had jumped to more than 12 years (Jones (2002)).
Even more dramatic is the rise of longevity in the same period. At the beginning of
last century, life expectancy at birth was, on average, less than 48 years, according to the
National Vital Statistics Reports (2002). One hundred years later it was estimated to be
77 years. Although most gains were related to reduction of child mortality, the increase of
adult longevity in the same period is very signiﬁcant. The life expectancy of a man aged 20
years in 1900 was 42.8 years, but in 2000 a man of the same age was expected to die 57.8
years later, a 15-years variation.
These two facts may not be unrelated. Greater longevity allows for extension of the
population working life and, consequently, an increase in the present value of the ﬂow of wages
of a given investment in education. Higher returns to education in turn induce individuals
to stay longer in school, increasing the average human capital of the population, with a
potential eﬀect on long-run income.
At the same time, the number of years individuals spend in retirement increased contin-
uously in the previous century. Lee(2001) calculates that the expected period of retirement
increased from 2.6 years for the cohort born in 1880 to 13.1 years to the cohort born in 1930.
Moreover, labor-force participation for men aged 65 and over went from 58% in 1930 to only
16% by 1985 (Kalemli-Ozcan and Weil (2004)). In principle, this fact does not contradict
the link between life expectancy and schooling, as working and retirement lives could have
increased with the longevity. However, Gendell and Siegel (1992) estimate that age at ﬁnal
retirement has fallen by 4 to 5 years since 1950, for both men and women. Median age of
retirement for men fell from 66.9 years in 1950-55 to 62.6 in 1985-1990. More years at school
and younger retirement age can only mean shorter career length, something at odds with
the idea that longevity inﬂuences schooling because it increases the period one can enjoy the
return to education investment.
In this paper we develop a model that reconciles the above facts. Individuals allocate
their total lifetime between education, working and retirement. They also decide at each
moment how to divide their time between labor and leisure and how much to save or consume
2out of their income. The labor/leisure choice is key for the retirement decision. In order to
explain, however, why people stop working completely at a certain age and do not spread
leisure evenly, the model incorporates experience-earnings proﬁles that mimics the evidence
from the labor literature (e.g., Heckman, Lochner and Todd (2003), among others). At a
given moment of a worker’s life, productivity growth slows down or decreases, so that labor
supply falls continuously up to a point when the marginal gain of working is smaller than
that of leisure and then individuals leave the labor market for good.
In this model, increases in longevity raises investment in education and retirement life,
everything else constant. We are then able to explain in an uniﬁed framework these two
life-cycle observations. The model is simulated after being calibrated to U.S. observations.
We reproduced qualitatively and quantitatively the main facts. Moreover, if learning tech-
nology is faster today than in the past-something that one may infer from estimations across
diﬀerent decades - in addition to rising retirement life we obtain that retirement age falls
with longevity. This is so because agents prefer to work more intensively when they are
young and more productive, increase savings, and retire earlier. Another result is that when
we use the population growth rates of the beginning and end of the century, we reproduce
schooling levels observed at these two points in time.
The theory we propose is also convenient to study development eﬀects of public taxation.
We introduce in the economy distortions to human and physical capital investment as well as
labor taxation. The many decision dimensions and two sectors of production (“goods” and
“education”) constitute a rich general equilibrium environment to explore the transmission
mechanisms of public policy. For instance, labor taxation distorts the work-leisure decision,
but also the education choice - as it impacts its return - and retirement, because it changes the
opportunity cost of not working. The last two channels are not usually present in this type
of analysis. Consequently, by just focusing on the ﬁrst dimension, and on its indirect impact
on physical capital (also present here), there is a tendency to underestimate the impact of
labor taxation. As a matter of fact, we show that in the long-run labor taxation may be
more detrimental to per capita income levels than capital and human capital taxation, a
result that contrasts with Lucas(1990), among many.
We believe that this article extends and improves the previous literature in many respects.
First, as said before, we bring together in a single model two strands of the literature that
study separately, in the context of development and growth, the impact of longevity on
schooling and retirement. In Soares (2003), Enrlich and Lui (1991) Khakemi-Ozacan, Ryder
3and Weil(2000) and Boucekkine, de la Croix and Licandro(2002) longer lives become by
deﬁnition longer career span and retirement is non-existent. That may be a good hypothesis
for the seventeenth and eighteenth century Europe, the period examined by Boucekkine, de
la Croix and Licandro(2003), but certainly not for the U.S. after 1950. Kabosky(2003) allows
working life to vary with longevity, but he treats career spans exogenously and calibrates it
to the U.S. observed path1.
As opposed to some of the studies above, in our framework schooling and human capital
have level eﬀects on per capita income, not permanent growth eﬀects. The evidence in Bils
and Klenow (2000) and Krueger and Lindhal (2000) does not favor the latter, nor externality
due to human capital. Moreover, the model generates rising schooling as a steady-state result,
in contrast to Jones(2002).
A second literature that relates to ours investigates the links between longevity and re-
tirement. Khakemi-Ozacan and Weil(2004) show that exogenous decreases in the probability
of death, which allows people to better plan saving for old age, generates longer retirement
from life. This is a diﬀerent explanation from ours, which relies on the income eﬀect due
to the longevity-schooling channel and declining productivity, on the individual level, at old
age. Their model also incorporates labor-leisure choices, but there is no education decision.
As our taxation exercises show, these two dimensions are closely linked. In a sense, our
explanation also relates to that in Graebner(1980), says that technological change leads to
retirement because the learning of old people is slower, making then obsolete in periods of
faster innovation. In our model there are diﬀerent learning rates for young and old peo-
ple, the latter being smaller. However, one also needs longevity eﬀects to explain higher
retirement life in the dimension observed in the past. Not to mention, of course, schooling
expansion.
Finally, we also study the long-run impact of human capital, physical capital and labor
taxation. In our model, as in Trosten(1993) and Bills and Klenow(2002), foregone wages are
not the only cost of human-capital investment, there are also tuition costs. We show that
in this framework, labor taxes and taxes on tuition have signiﬁcant impact on the schooling
decision. As opposed to Stokey and Rebelo (1995) and Hendricks (1999) they do not have
1Also related to our article are Bils and Klenow (2000) and Mateus-Planas (2001), which also use a Min-
cerian formulation of schooling with a life-cycle decision regarding education. Neither formulation considers
a second sector that provides educational services as we do; they have no taxation and do not explore fully
the general equilibrium impact of life-cycle features of human-capital investment.
4growth eﬀect, only level eﬀect. This is similar to Trosten(1993)who nevetheless, ignores
life-cycle eﬀects as he uses a dynastic framework. It also contrasts with Lucas(1990), who
suggests that life-cycle eﬀects are not relevant in analyzing the aggregate eﬀects of taxation.
Results in this article show that they are qualitatively and quantitatively important.
The article is organized as follows. In the next section we present the model and brieﬂy
discuss the hypothesis of exogenous life expectancy. Section 3 discusses calibration and
measurement issues. Results concerning the link between education and retirement are
presented in Section4, while sensitivity analysis, focusing mostly on distortions, are presented
in Section 5. Section 6 concludes.
2 The Model
The model assumes ﬁnite lifetime with endogenous decision of education, labor eﬀort (leisure),
retirement and savings. Human capital depends on the education acquired while in school
and on-the-job learning, which is exogenous. Individuals choose how long to go to school
so as to maximize the present value of lifetime earnings. The return to human-capital in-
vestment depends on, longevity, taxes and the experience proﬁle, among other variables.
Retirement is also inﬂuenced by the experience proﬁle: if productivity is falling too fast at
some point in life, it may be better to stay in home and enjoy leisure. As for the production
side of this economy, there are two sectors - the “good” and “educational” sectors - both
of which use physical capital and eﬀective labor according to homogenous production func-
tions. Government school-tuition taxes, labor and physical-capital incomes. School tuition
is equivalent to a direct cost of schooling and is not proportional to wages. Tax revenues are
transferred lump-sum to individuals.
Although most of the related literature assumes, as we do, exogeneity of life expectancy,
this is of course a major issue. Preston (1975) shows that economic advances in the last
century in developed and less developed countries was not a major factor in the increase of
life expectancy. Simple sanitation and medical discoveries, for instance, that can be copied
at almost no cost, were more relevant. He constructs a scatter diagram for diﬀerent nations,
showing that the relationship between life expectancy at birth and national income per
capita shifted upwards during the twentieth century: a country with income per capita in
1960 between $100 and $500 had 10-12 more years of life expectancy than another country
5with a similar income level in 1930. Soares (2003) adds 1990 data to Preston‘s ﬁgure and
also concludes that for constant levels of income, life expectancy has been rising. He shows
that a nation with per capita income of $5000 in 1995 had a life expectancy roughly 10%
higher than a country with the same per capita income in 1960
Preston(1975) estimates that factors exogenous to a country‘s level of economic develop-
ment account for 75-90 per cent of the growth in life expectancy for the world as a whole
between the 1930s and the 1960s and that these exogenous factors had a major eﬀect on
mortality trends in more developed as well as in less developed countries. France and Austria
gained almost 13.7 years of life expectancy in the period, only 0.4 years above Indonesia‘s
gain and less than 3 years above that of the Philippines Lee(1980), Kirk (1996) and Pre-
ston(1977), among others, also conﬁrm in diﬀerent contexts the exogeneity of life expectancy,
which is then assumed in the present model.
This section is organized as follows: in the next subsection we study the production side
of the economy and in the following individual choices. We then study demography and the
government and present the equilibrium of the model in the last subsection.
2.1 Firms
There are two sectors in this economy, one that produces consumption and investment goods
and other that produces educational services; both use eﬀective labor and physical capital
as inputs. Let output Y1 in the Goods Sector be a function of physical-capital services K1





where A1 is the total-factor productivity of the goods sector. Skilled labor is given by:
H1 = L1e
φ(TS)
where L1 is raw labor. According to the equation above, the productivity of a worker with
TS years of schooling is eφ(TS) greater than that of a worker of the same cohort with no
education at all. The function φ(TS) is assumed to be increasing and to exhibit diminishing
returns, and φ
′(TS)eφ(TS) gives the increase in eﬀective labor input from one extra year of
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is the i-th sector employment of capital in eﬃciency units.
In this economy there is free mobility of factors across sectors, so that price factors are
the same in both sectors. Considering the good 1 as the numeraire, it follows that:






w ≡ w1 = (1 − α1)A1k
α1
1 = p(1 − α2)A2k
α2
2 = w2,
where p is the relative price of educational services in units of goods. The factor-allocation
problem is standard and is presented in the appendix. The production side of this economy
is essentially a traditional two-sector, two-factor model, and from its solution we obtain the
oﬀer function of each sector, given p and k, the per-worker capital stock in eﬃciency units:
yi(p,k) = Aile
φ(TS)li(p,k)[ki(p)]
αi , i = 1,2 (2)
where yi is the per capita supply function of sector i, l is the total ﬂow of raw labor services
per capita and li is the share of labor in sector i.
The two-sector framework is a convenient and realistic way of modeling the direct cost
of educational services. Moreover, without an education sector of production, taxes on labor
and on the direct cost of schooling would be equivalent.
2.2 Household
Individuals live for T years and retire after TR years. Retirement is not mandatory but
is chosen optimally. In the ﬁrst part of the life cycle, (“youth”, TY), individuals ﬁrst stay
at home for TC years and then go to school for TS years. Once they leave school, they
cannot return. They then join the labor market, working for TW years. Active life has two
sub-periods: TW1, when wages increase with on-the-job learning - which is exogenous in the
7model - and TW2, when they decrease (or increase at a slower pace). This latter hypothesis
follows ample evidence from the labor literature (e.g., Heckman, J., L. Lochner e P. Todd,
2003) of a hump-shaped (log) earnings-experience proﬁle throughout the worker’s life-cycle.
At each instant of time the household decides how much to consume or save and how
much work eﬀort to supply. A once-for-all decision is also made on how much education to
buy, which is equivalent in the model to deciding the optimal period of time TS of staying




−ρa [β lnc(a) + (1 − β)ln(1 − l(a))]da, (3)
where c(a) and l(a) are respectively the consumption and the labor eﬀort of an age a indi-
vidual, while ρ is the discount rate. We already normalized the time endowment to one.
Individuals have three sources of income - wages from labor services, rents from capital,
and public transfer - which are used to pay for school tuition and consumption goods. In


















where r is the interest rate, w(Ts,a,x) is the wage of age-a worker with Ts years of education
and experience x, τL is a tax (or subsidy) rate on wages and χ are government transfers.
The last expression on the right hand side is tuition costs, where τH is a tax (or subsidy)
rate on education purchases and η the amount of education services that the student has to
buy in order to be in school2. The above expression simply says that the net present value
of wages and government transfers should be equal to the net present value of consumption
and tuition costs.
2We are assuming indivisibility in the human- capital accumulation process. In order to increase his
education level, an individual has to buy η units of educational services but cannot buy fractions of it.
82.2.1 Labor Supply and Retirement Decisions
The function w(Ts,a,x) follows closely the labor literature:
w(Ts,a,x) = we
φ(TS)x(a),
where x(a) is the “experience function” that gives the increase in productivity while at work.
There is ample evidence that for a given level of education, workers’ experience-earnings
proﬁles are such that wages increase initially but later in life decrease with age. Heckman,
Lochner and Todd (2003), for instance, using Census data from 1940 to 1990, for white and
black males, show that in most cases, regarders of the educational level, mean log annual
wage and salary income is a parabolic function of experience. The variation of productivity
due to on-the-job learning ( x) will be modeled as:
x(a) =
 
eγ(a−TY) if TY ≤ a ≤ TY + TW1
eγTW1−ξ(a−(TY+TW1)) if a ≥ TY + TW1,
(5)
According to the above function, from the moment a worker enters the job market ( TY ) to
some turning point TW1 labor productivity due to experience increases at a constant rate γ.
After this point, it falls at a rate ξ until the worker retires or dies3.
Simple calculation gives us the ﬁrst-order condition for the labor supply choice at each
moment of time:






where   is the Lagrange multiplier associated to restriction (4).
In this economy retirement is endogenous. Given the decrease of productivity at old age,
there is a moment when the marginal gain of staying longer in the job market and being able
to aﬀord more consumption goods becomes smaller then the marginal gain from leaving the
job market and using the entire time endowment for leisure. At this point the individual
leaves the job market, so that retirement occurs when labor supply is zero:
1 − β
 
= (1 − τL)we
φ(TS)e
−(r−ρ)(TY+TW )x(TY + TW).
3Function x(a) is more commonly represented in the literature by x(a) = eγ(a−TY )+ξ(a−TY )2
, with γ > 0
and ξ < 0. However, in the present context the computational procedure implied by this functional form
would be extremely cumbersome, so we approximated it by (5) for simplicity.
9In the relevant situation when TY + TW > TY + TW1 we have, after applying (5) in the
expression above, that:
e
−ρ(TY+TW )1 − β
 
= e
−r(TY+TW ) (1 − τL)we
φ(TS)e
γTW1−ξTW2. (7)
The equation above equates the present value leisure, at retirement time, to the net present
value of wages.
2.2.2 Consumption Decision
In their consumption decision, individuals maximize (3) subject to (4). Solving for consump-
tion, we obtain the individual’s consumption proﬁle:
c(a) = c(0)e
(r−ρ)a. (8)
In order to ﬁnd consumption at each moment of time we need to know the initial consump-
tion. After substituting into the budget constraint (equation 4 above) the expressions (8),
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The right-hand term is the individual’s total wealth at the time of birth, given by the
market value of labor endowment4 and government transfers. The household spends his
wealth (in the left-hand side) buying goods, education services and leisure, respectively.
Note that we have already substituted into the equation above the steady-state equilibrium
condition Consumption and education decision are stationary across cohort.
2.2.3 Education Decision
In this economy, the education decision is equivalent to choosing the optimal time to leave
school. In the beginning of their lives, individuals pick the optimal quantity of education in
4The market value of labor endowment has two components, as seen inside the brackets. The ﬁrst term
corresponds to the period in which experiences increases at a rate γ and the second to the period in which
it falls at a rate ζ
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In making this decision (for a ﬁxed retirement life), individuals consider that the longer they
stay in school, the shorter their productive life (TW), given that life span is exogenous. More-
over, in addition to the foregone wages, there is the direct cost of school tuition. We assume
that the age at which labor productivity peaks, TS + TW1, is exogenous and independent of
education; any additional year at school reduces the productive life at the ﬁrst sub-period5.
In this case, the ﬁrst-order condition for the educational choice follows6:
(φ













(r−ρ)TY 1 − e−ρTW
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(r−ρ)TY + (1 + τH)ηp. (9)
The expression above equates the marginal contribution of schooling to lifetime earnings,
on the left-hand side, to its marginal cost, on the right-hand side. The latter is the oppor-
tunity cost (net of leisure) of not working (i.e., the wages lost) plus the tuition cost at the
time of stopping. The former is the impact on the present value of time endowment (net of
leisure) of staying in school one additional unit of time - which implies higher wages in the
future due to more schooling, but a loss of experience7.
Note that dividing both sides of equation (9) by 1+τH one can see (recall from (7) that
(1 − β)/  is proportional to weφ(TS)) that tax on tuition, in the context of the schooling
decision, is equivalent to direct taxation on labor earnings. Note also that were it not for the
tuition term, human capital taxation or taxes on wages would have no impact at all, as a
5This hypothesis seems to us more sensible than assuming that TW1 alone is exogenous. Experience-
earning proﬁles in Heckman, Lochner and Todd (2003) of diﬀerent schooling levels peak at approximately
the same age, especially in the case of white males.
6Actually, (9) is the ﬁrst-order condition with respect to education after, for the sake of simpliﬁcation we
substituted in (7) using also the fact that at retirement time, wages (net of leisure) are zero.
7It may be helpful, in order to get more intuition, to think of a model with no labor choice and no
experience gain. In this case equation (9) simpliﬁes to: weφ(TS)φ
′(TS)1−e−rTW
r = weφ(TS) + (1 + τH)ηq,
which equates the present value of staying in school one additional unit of time (the left-hand side) to the
opportunity cost of not working plus the tuition cost at the time of heaving school (the right-hand side).
11tax term (1 + τH)(1 − τL) would divide both sides of the above expression (all components
being proportional to weφ(TS)) and, consequently, be eliminated.
2.3 Demography
At each instant of time a cohort of size ment is born, where m ≡ n/
 
1 − e−nT 
, so that total






Within a cohort, all individuals are identical. Let N (a) be the share of the a-cohort.on the





Let NC,NS,NW, and NR be, respectively, the population of children, students, workers,






−nTC 1 − e−nTS
1 − e−nT .
Likewise, we get that:
NC =
1 − e−nTC
1 − e−nT , NW = e
−nTY 1 − e−nTW
1 − e−nT and NR = e
−n(T−TY)1 − e−nTR
1 − e−nT .
2.3.1 Total Labor Supply
In order to characterize the supply functions given by (2) we have to determine l, the total






After substituting the experience proﬁle (5), labor supply (6), the expression for N (a) (10)


















At a point in time, government revenue is given by the sum of taxation of educational




N (a)ηda = τHpmηe
−nTC 1 − e−nTS
n
,






∇and the third component byτKRK. Consequently, the per capita government transfer is
the sum of these 3 terms divided by ent :
χ = τHpηme










after solving the integral in the last term on the right hand side.
2.5 Equilibrium
Before presenting the equilibrium conditions of this economy, we need to derive an expression
for aggregate consumption, which is necessary for the equilibrium of the market for goods.







If we substitute equation (8) into this last equation we obtain
c = c(0)m
e(r−(ρ+n))T − 1
r − (ρ + n)
(13)
The ﬁnal expression is trivially obtained by plugging the expression for initial consump-
tion in the above expression.
We can now describe the steady-state equilibrium of this economy, which is given by the
following equations:
13• The equilibrium in the market for educational services is:
y2(p,k) = ηme
−nTC 1 − e−nTS
n
. (14)
• The equilibrium in the assets market:
r = (1 − τK)R − δ = (1 − τK)α1A1k
α1−1
1 − δ, (15)
• The goods-market equilibrium is:
y1(p,k) = c + (δ + n)
K
ent, (16)
where c is given optimally by equation (13), after the expressions forinitial consumption
and for government transfers, (12), is plugged in.
• The equilibrium condition with respect to the educational choice, which is given by (9)
after using equation (7) to eliminate (1 − β)/ .
Note that the equilibrium in the labor and capital markets is implicit in the supply
functions y1(p,k) and y2(p,k).
3 Quantitative Methodology
3.1 Calibration
The model is calibrated to the U.S. in the recent past, assuming the country is in a steady-
state equilibrium. Parameters of interest can be separated into two groups. In the ﬁrst group
they are considered as observables while in the second parameters are obtained - measured
- using the restrictions imposed by the data on the equilibrium solution of the model. We
start presenting observable variables, and in this case we follow the standard procedure of
employing data from the U.S. Census, National Account and similar sources. In some cases
independent estimations were used.
The capital shares α1 and α2 were set equal to 0.4 and 0.05, respectively, and were
calculated using U.S. time series data from the National Income and Product Accounts
(NIPA). The share of total labor force in the educational sector, l2, also obtained from
14the NIPA, is the average from 1987-1997 of the ratio of Full-Time Equivalent Employees
in Educational Services to the Total Full-Time Equivalent Employees and was found to be
0.077. The value of i, set to 0.2, was also obtained in the NIPA for the post-1960 period and
so was the value of the capital-output ratio, κ, which will be useful later for the calibration
of k and δ. We normalized income per capita, y, to one, without loss of generality.
Life expectancy T was set to 77, which is the value reported in the National Vital Statistics
Reports (2002) for 2000. The growth rate of the population is such that n = ln(1,013), where
1.3% is the annual population growth rate since 1900, obtained from the U.S. Census. The
interest rate was set to r = ln(1.05).
The variable TS corresponds to data on years of schooling attained by the working-age
population (25 years old and over). It was calculated from Census data and set to 13. In
this case we followed the procedure in Jones (2002), simply extending his series until 2000,
as it ended in 1993.







We follow their estimation and use ψ = 0.58 and θ = 0.32. Hence, instead of the more usual
linear return to education assumed in most of the literature, we posit diminishing returns
because this seems to be the case when comparing micro estimates across countries (e.g.,
Psacharopoulos (1994)) and because the linear speciﬁcation was rejected by the econometric
tests in Bils and Klenow(2000).
TW1, γ and ξ were obtained from Heckman, J., L. Lochner e P. Todd, (2003)8. These
authors use non-parametric techniques to estimate experience-earnings proﬁles using Census
data. As we assumed linear growth (and linear decrease, after TW1), in order to ﬁnd γ we
adjusted to their estimated dummies a straight line until the peak TW1. We follow a similar
procedure to ﬁnd ξ. This is of course an approximation, but it is necessary to render the
model treatable. In the benchmark calibration, γ was set equal to 1.25% and ξ to 1%.
An important piece of statistics that will be important for the calibration procedure is







8We would like to thank Petra Todd who gave us access to the estimations and data of this article.









r + ξ − ρ
+ e
−(r+ξ−ρ)TW21 − e−(r−(ρ+γ))TW1
r − (ρ + γ)
 
. (18)
There is evidence in McGrattan and Rogerson (1998) that over the life cycle people work
on average 18 hours a week. In order to obtain l, we divided this value by the total number
of weekly hours available to work, which is 24 minus 8 (number of hours for sleeping and
physical needs) times seven. We found l = 0.161.
We now explain the solution of the calibration procedure, the methodology used to obtain
or measure the parameters not directly observable.
Using y = 1 and κ = 3, we obtained trivially the steady-state value of per capital , K
ent =
3. We used i, κ and n to ﬁnd - according to the steady-state expression (δ + n)κ = i - the
depreciation rate, which was found to be 0.053. It is also immediate to get TY = TC +TS =
19, and consequently TY + TW1 = 51, the age at which productivity peaks.
Solving (18) we found TW2 = 16.22, and solving (11) we got l = 0.15, the (per capita) total
ﬂow of labor services. It then follows from the deﬁnition (see appendix) that   k = 2.23,the
value of the per-worker capital stock in eﬃciency units. Also from the appendix, and the
hypothesis of full employment of factors, we have the capital in eﬃcient units per sector,
k1 = 2.39 and k2 = 0.19.
Equation (14) solves for the total-factor productivity of the educational sector, A2 = 2.37.
Plugging this value and those of α1 and α2 in equation (21) of the appendix, it solves for
p/A1 = 0.41. The deﬁnition of y ( y1 + py2), its normalization to one and the formulas of
sector supply imply A1 = 0.54 and p = 0.22.
A similar procedure is used to measure the tax rates: from the equilibrium condition of
the asset market, equation (15), it follows that τK = 0.20. For τH and τL we solved jointly
the ﬁrst-order condition for the education decision - equation (9) - and the goods market
equilibrium - equation (16) - and obtained τH = 0.02 and τL = 0.45.
The parameter ρ was calibrated so that the life-cycle labor proﬁle reproduced closely those
constructed by Rogerson and McGrattan(1998). Charts 2-4 in this article present average
hours worked per person by cohorts during their life cycle (extrapolated from United States
Census data). Especially in the case of males and total population, these proﬁles are such
that there is a monotonic increase up to a peak, after which the number of hours worked
reduces very fast as people get older. By setting ρ = r − γ + ln(1.0035) we obtain a
16labor proﬁle similar to those. By examining (6) and keeping everything constant but a, one
can see that l(a) increases continuously with age until a = TY + TW1 and then falls, also
continuously9.
Finally, from the ﬁrst order condition of the consumption choice we know that
β
c(0) =  
where   is the Lagrange multiplier associated to the budget constraint (4). From the ﬁrst-
order condition for leisure choice we know that, at retirement,
1−β
∆ ,=   where
∆ = (1 − τL)we
φ(TS)e






As opposed to the neoclassical growth model with inﬁnitely-lived individuals, in which β = l,
average labor supply here does not coincide with β. The reason is that now labor supply is not
uniform throughout the individual´s life cycle and we have to take into account retirement,
ﬁnite career span and time at school. Moreover, labor eﬀort is not constant during productive
life. Note also that, while in inﬁnitely-lived agent models researchers usually ﬁnd values for
beta close to one third, in our case this parameter was found to be considerably smaller.
One way to check if our methodology is reasonably sound is to confront the resulting
macro variables or parameters from the model with their observed counterpart. For instance,
in the model government participation in GDP is 0.35%, not far from the NIPA ﬁgures.
Another comforting result is that our measured tax rate on labor is close to that estimated
by Prescott(2002), 40%.
4 Longevity, Retirement and Education
The ﬁrst group of model simulations study the impact of longevity on life-cycle features - time
at school and in the labor market. We kept constant TFP, distortions, population growth
rate, γ and ζ. We also assumed that the productivity peak changes with longevity, so that it
will be always the case that TY + TW1 = (51/77) ∗ T. This is somewhat arbitrary, but there
9In Rogerson and McGrattan (1998) the positively sloped part is not continuous, it is ﬂatter close to the
peak. Our formulation misses this fact, but it would be a hard task to reproduce it especially because this
discontinuity changes with cohort, as does the peak. The ln(1.0035) approximates the mean growth of hours
in the ﬁrst period.
17is no clear pattern in the data. For robustness check, we also use alternative parameters and
hypotheses. The model is then solved, using diﬀerent values of T, for education, retirement,
capital, labor, prices and output.
The ﬁgure below displays the relationship between longevity and education.










Figure 1: Longevity and Education
The model succeeds in capturing a positive relationship between life expectancy and
schooling. We used longevity values in the 48-77 years interval, comprising the variation of
life expectancy observed in the last century. Greater longevity allows for the extension of
the population’s working life and consequently an increase in the present value of the ﬂow
of wages of a given investment in education. Higher returns to education in turn induce
individuals to stay longer in school. The model simulation found an elasticity of schooling
to longevity of 0.7410.
Note that the model obtains rising educational attainment as a steady-state result. Jones
(2002) argues that, from the standpoint of a neoclassical growth model, increases in education
10Due to the large variation of values we used the arc-elasticity deﬁnition.
18should generate temporarily high growth rates and long-run level eﬀect, at the same time
that the evidence for the U.S. points toward an economy ﬂuctuating around its balanced
growth path and no acceleration in the growth rate. This is certainly true in an inﬁnity-
lived agent model in which the return to schooling by construction does not depend on
longevity. In our model, however, increases in the latter raises the return of educational
investment so that individuals stay longer in school. Hence, the observed increase in life
expectancy during the last century in the US explains, partially at least, the observed path
of educational attainment as a steady-state result: to each T corresponds a diﬀerent TS.
Note that although the model simulation is able to reproduce the positive relationship
between longevity and education, it tends to overestimate schooling at lower levels of life
expectancy. In 1910 the median educational attainment of males aged 25 year and over,
according to estimates in Gustavus and Nam (1964), was 6.8 years. Life expectancy in this
year, according to the National Vital Statistic Report, was 51.45 years. In this case the model
ﬁnds TS = 8.5. When we average with the corresponding ﬁgures of education attainment of
females, who were largely out of the labor force by this date, we still over-predict schooling
by more than one year.
The likely cause of the mismatch is that the simulations are done with parameters cali-
brated from recent data (e.g., 1990 or 2000) or, as in the case of n, using long-run averages.
However, experience proﬁle and return to education, for instance, did not remain constant
during last century, so that it is not surprising that we could not reproduce the schooling
trends perfectly . When we modify the calibration, allowing some parameters to better
match the corresponding values of a given period, results tend to improve11.
The model also predicts that retirement life increases with longevity, reproducing the
evidence for the U.S. When life expectancy is 48 years of life, the ﬁgure for males in 1900,
the model predicts that people will not stop working before dying. However, using the
numbers for 2000, 77 years, the model estimates that retirement life will last almost ten
years. The signiﬁcant expansion of retirement life, as we noted in the introduction, is the
11For instance, in the ﬁrst half of the last century average population growth, according to Census data,
was 1.40% a year. Using this value instead of that of the benchmark calibration we obtain TS = 7.05 in 1910,
very close to the actual ﬁgure. Hence, the combined eﬀect of higher longevity and lower population growth
explains schooling, so that the model reproduces not only qualitatively the positive relationship between
longevity and education, but also quantitatively. Kabosky(2003) has also noted that fertility reduction
throughout the twentieth century had a strong eﬀect on the growth of education.
19observed evidence for the twentieth century.
In the model, retirement life increases with life expectancy because of an income eﬀect:
education rises with longevity and so do wages. As leisure is a normal good, individuals
consume more of it. Moreover, given T, people retire because in the second period of their
working life, as productivity falls, wages decrease and so does the relative cost of leisure,
leading people to decrease their work eﬀort. At a certain point, the marginal gain of staying
in the job market is smaller than that of dedicating all the time endowment to leisure. In
other words, given that people are more productive when young and mature, they rather work
harder during this part of their life, save for retirement, and then stop working completely
later in life when productivity is falling. This diﬀerence in productivity is exactly the reason
households do not spread leisure evenly throughout their life, as the return to work is lower
at old age.
Figure 2 below presents labor proﬁles as life expectancy goes from 48 to 68 and then to
77. Some facts are worthy of comment. As longevity increases, people enter later in the
labor market (as seen in Figure 1). They also work less hours during the period of their life
when productivity is increasing, as the graphs shift down continuously. This is due to the
income eﬀect caused by higher education and wages and the normality of leisure. Finally,
people stay longer in the labor market.






















Figure 2: Life cycle labor proﬁles with diﬀerent longevities
One caveat is that, although we were able to obtain increasing retirement life throughout
the years as in the data, we are not able to reproduce the evidence that retirement age has
been falling in the recent past. We do not consider this a serious problem as the simulated
ﬁgures are close to constant for the last few years. For instance, retirement age was estimated
to be 67.2 years of age in 2000, 66.3 in 1990, 65.4 in 1980 and 63.5 in 1970.
Nonetheless, the observed fact is that on average individuals are retiring earlier in life
over the last decades, and we do not capture this perfectly. One possible solution is to change
across years the learning coeﬃcients γ and ζ. This is not arbitrary because the estimated
dummies are not the same across decades. For instance, the estimated productivity proﬁle
in 1940 is below that of 1990 for its entire positive portion. In this case γ could be larger
in 1990 than in 1940, so that people would work more intensively in the ﬁrst part of their
productive life, increase savings and retire earlier. Figure 3 shows two labor proﬁles, one
obtained from the benchmark calibration ( γ = 1.25%) and one using gamma equal to 2.0%.





















Figure 3: Life cycle labor proﬁles with diﬀerent learning rates
If the productivity growth rate (i.e., gamma) in the ﬁrst period of working life rises,
individuals will work more intensively during most of their active life and then retire earlier.
This is so because the opportunity cost of leisure in the earlier years of working life increases
with respect to that of old age.
Note also that individuals enter later in the job market, acquiring more education. This
means that, in essence, what matters for schooling is not the extension of productivity life,
but its intensity. In models such as Soares(2003) and Kalemhi-Ozcan and Weil (2000), longer
life allows for longer productivity life, raising the return to human-capital investment and
so to education. One problem here is that, especially in rich capitalist economies, increases
in life expectancy were followed by more than proportional increases in retirement, in which
case this result does not hold. However, if for some reason the productivity growth rate due
to experience jumps up, the return to education investment also increases, so people will
want to acquire more of it even if longevity does not change. If this jump is high enough,
the extension of productivity life - i.e., time in the labor market - may well decrease as in
Figure 312.
12Note, however, that the evidence is not clear that γ increased monotonically in all the previous decades.
22Table 1 below resumes some of the above results while also presenting the impact of
longevity changes on income, keeping all other parameters constant.
Table 1: Long-Run Impact of
Longevity
T TS y TR Retirement
77 13 1 67.22 9.78
70 12.1 0.92 63.10 6.90
65 11.2 0.86 60.10 4.90
60 10.4 0.80 57.05 2.95
55 9.4 0.73 53.95 1.05
50 8.0 0.63 50.00 0
As one could expect, per capita income decreases with longevity. For instance, when
T = 60, estimated income per capita is 80% of that of the benchmark model. One possible
interpretation is that a country with everything else equal to the U.S. but longevity would
be 20% poorer if its life expectancy was 17 years smaller. Some of the channels are displayed
in the table (smaller education and earlier retirement). How relevant is this? In 1997, life
expectancy in Bolivia was 61 years and its income relative to the U.S. was 9%. Hence, there
is still a very large income diﬀerence left unexplained. This is not surprising, given that there
are many other dimensions were these economies can diﬀer that we hold constant, such as
productivity13.
As already commentedon, retirement life increases more than proportionally with longevity,
reproducing the evidence: when T is 77 the model predicts that an individual will spend
13% of his life in retirement, but only 1% when T is 55 and he will die before retirement if
longevity is smaller than 52 years.
In any case, what matters is the relative growth rate at diﬀerent ages, and the evidence is very strong that
experience gains in old age have been falling much faster in recent years.
13Results concerning productivity diﬀerences are as expected. An economy equal in every aspect to the
US but with only 80% of its total- factor productivity would have only 70% of the income per capita of the
latter. The impact is mostly felt through physical capital, as education and retirement almost do not change
with A1.
235 Distortions, Education and Income
Up to this point we have kept distortions constant while allowing longevity to vary. We
have seen that changes in life expectancy have signiﬁcant impacts on life-cycle decisions
such as education and retirement and also on income per capita. In this section we study
the sensitivity of the model to modiﬁcations in the three distortion parameters.
As the model includes life-cycle features, saving and labor decisions and two sectors of
production, its general equilibrium structure incorporates diﬀerent transmission mechanisms,
and is a rich environment to study the relative impact of diﬀerent forms of taxation. Remem-
ber that in this economy the government imposes taxes on labor income, capital income and
the direct cost of education. It is not clear which of these has a stronger impact on education
and income. For instance, tax on physical-capital returns imposes the usual distortions on
saving decisions, investment and capital stock. The latter aﬀects the marginal productivity
of labor - and so the labor and education decision - and the production of education services,
which uses capital. Tax on labor, in it turn, directly aﬀects the labor and leisure decision.
It also aﬀects the education and retirement decision, and so working life and the long-run
return on physical and human capital.
The picture below presents life cycle labor proﬁles for τL equal to 0.2, 0.4 and 0.6. Note
that the graphs shift down as τL increases, so that, similarly to the standard neoclassical
model, higher taxes on labor income lead to less hours worked. There however are, two
additional eﬀects: individuals will enter and leave the labor market earlier. In the ﬁrst case
because more taxes on labor reduces the return to human-capital investment, so schooling
decreases. In the second case because the relative cost of leisure - and retirement too -
decreases. This a signiﬁcant ampliﬁcation of the eﬀect of labor taxation on the economy
that is not captured in standard neoclassical models. Moreover, as labor supply decreases,
physical capital also falls in equilibrium, as its marginal product is now smaller.






















Figure 4: Life cycle labor proﬁles for diﬀerent labor taxes
Table 2 below presents the results of an exercise in which τL varies and everything else
is kept constant at the benchmark values, similar to the picture above:.
Table 2: Long-Run Impact of
Labor Taxation
τL TS y TR
0.45 13 1 67.22
0.0 18.3 1.93 77
0.2 18.2 1.85 77
0.4 14.9 1.23 69.8
0.6 1.53 0.19 57.5
As said before, income in the benchmark economy - the U.S. in the present - is set
equal to one and the estimated tax rate was found to be 0.45, as seen in the ﬁrst line. In
addition to the direct impact on labor supply displayed in Figure 4, reductions in τL increase
education, retirement age and capital (not shown). For instance, in an economy in which
25the tax rate is 0.20, close to half the U.S. ﬁgure, the model predicts that individuals will stay
ﬁve additional years in the educational system and not retire before dying, although at this
moment the labor eﬀort will be considerably smaller than in the peak years. The inﬂuence
of labor taxation on retirement reinforces the impact on per capita income, wich in this case
(τL = 0.20) will be 85 percent larger. In contrast, if labor taxes were higher and equal to
0.60, income per capita would be only 20% of the American income, and education close to
one tenth. This seems a bit strong, but it indicates that labor taxation has enough potential
to explain diﬀerences in standards of living (and educational levels) across economies.
Pictures similar to Figure 4 apply to the cases of τH and τK. (see the appendix). Table
3 below presents retirement age, per capita income and education levels corresponding to
diﬀerent values of τH. The ﬁrst line, once again, corresponds to the benchmark case.
.
Table 3 Long-Run Impact of
Human Capital Taxation
τH y Ts TR
0.02 1 13 67.22
0.20 0.85 10.46 66.52
0.40 0.38 3.02 62.75
0.6 0.20 0.65 59.69
Taxes on educational services have a signiﬁcant impact on this economy. An economy
equal to the U.S. in everything but τH equal to 0.2 instead of the benchmark value of 0.02,
would be 15% poorer and would have 2.5 years less schooling.
Figure 5 below compares the relative impact on income per capita of the diﬀerent types
of taxes, when we hold other parameters (and the two remaining taxes) constant at their
calibrated values.













Figure 5:the impact of the diﬀerent types of taxes on income
Note that the three lines almost intersect around 0.72, so that income per capita implied
by this level of taxation will be the same whether we consider τH, τK or τL. As we decrease
the level of tax rates, we notice that the simulated eﬀect of labor taxation on long-run income
is greater, followed by that of τK, which, in turn is stronger than that of τH.
The dominant impact of labor taxation is at ﬁrst thought, surprising and is a feature of
the life-cycle structure of the model. Note that distortions to the accumulation of physical
capital have a direct eﬀect on both sectors and an indirect eﬀect on the returns to educational
investment. In most studies on public ﬁnance, capital taxation is more detrimental to the
economy than labor taxation.
In this economy this is not the case, in the ﬁrst place because, as we can see from Figure
4, decreases in τL shifts up the life-cycle labor proﬁle and it is straightforward to verify that
the impact here is stronger than in the case of τK and τH. Moreover, individuals will retire
later or not retire at all if labor taxation is too small, something that we do not verify with
other forms of taxation. In the case of direct tax on tuition, this eﬀect is relatively small.
Finally, reductions in labor taxation raise the return to human capital investment leading
to higher schooling levels. At higher levels of labor taxation individuals acquire almost no
education, which is not true for capital taxation.
276 Conclusion
In this paper we have studied a ﬁnite life economy in which higher life expectancy explains
increases in schooling and retirement and plays an important role in the determination of
long-run income. This role could only appear because of the hypothesis of ﬁnite life and the
Mincerian formulation of human capital, which seem to us the most realistic assumptions.
When calibrated to the U.S. experience during last century we reproduced education levels
and showed that a 20% diﬀerence in longevity, everything else being constant, would lead to
a 15% gap in per capita income.
The mechanism of the model that allows for retirement, in addition to the labor-leisure
choice, is an experience proﬁle that mimics the parabolic shape estimated by studies in
the labor ﬁeld. As productivity decreases or slows down at old age, at a certain point in
life the marginal gain of working is below that of leisure, and people leave the job market.
Longer lives allow people to enjoy proportionally larger retirement. If, on top of that, the
productivity proﬁle jumps up so that young people learn relatively faster, we obtain that
the retirement age falls, replicating the evidence.
The sensitivity analysis and tax simulations showed that life-cycle aspects are very im-
portant to the study of public policy and the allocative eﬀect of taxation. Once schooling
and retirement decisions are incorporated to the analysis, and career span being ﬁnite, labor-
capital taxation and, to a lesser extent, human-capital taxation have signiﬁcant eﬀects on
the long-run level of per capita income and variables such as labor supply, retirement and
physical-capital investment. The literature on physical-capital taxation, however, is much
more extensive than that on human-capital taxation, although there are important excep-
tions, most of them using endogenous growth models. One possible reason is that in many
models taxation on human capital is neutral, as it decreases not only its return but also
reduces the cost of being out of the labor market. However, our results show that if there
are any other costs imposed on the acquisition of education which are not proportional to
wages (e.g., tuition), the long-run impact of any form of taxation on human capital - either
direct on tuition or indirect on wages - is relevant.
28.1 Appendix 1: Factor-allocation problem
In this economy there is free mobility of factors across sectors, so that factors price are the
same in both sectors. Considering the good 1 as the numeraire, it follows that:






w ≡ w1 = (1 − α1)A1k
α1
1 = p(1 − α2)A2k
α2
2 = w2,
where p is the relative price of educational services in units of goods. Dividing the second
equation by the ﬁrst we obtain the wage-rental ratio as a function of the capital-labor ratio








In order to express the relative price of ﬁnal goods as a function of the relative price of











If again we substitute (19) into this last equation we can express the relative price of


















From (19) and (20) follows the optimum capital-labor ratio as a function of the relative




















To wrap up the factor-allocation problem we have to ﬁnd the scale of production of each
sector. Let li be the share of the labor force in the i-th sector, l the (per capita) total ﬂow
of labor services and k the (per capita) endowment of capital. Full employment of labor and
capital services implies:
l1k1 + l2k2 = k
l1 + l2 = 1,
29where k ≡ K
lenteφ(TS) is the per-worker capital stock in eﬃciency units. These last two equa-
tions solve for li as a function of ki and k.
At a point in time, given k and p we get the oﬀer function of each sector as follows:
yi(p,k) = Aile
φ(TS)li(p,k)[ki(p)]
αi , i = 1,2 (22)
where ki (p) is given by (21), yi ≡
Yi
ent is the per capita supply functions,ent is total population
and:
l1(p,k) =
k2 (p) − k
k2 (p) − k1 (p)
, and l2(p,k) =
k − k1 (p)
k2 (p) − k1 (p)
It will be useful for the calibration to solve the model (under the assumption of full














30.2 Appendix 2: Additional Tables and Figures






















Figure A.1: Life-cycle labor proﬁles for diﬀerent tax rates on education






















Figure A.2: Life-cycle labor proﬁles for diﬀerent tax rates on capital
31Table A1: Long-Run Impact of
Physical Capital Taxation
τK y Ts TR
0.2 1 13 67.22
0.0 1.67 16.61 73.32
0.40 0.50 8.37 62.01
0.60 0.21 4.21 57.66
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